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Abstract
 
Political Economy of Budgetary Process has shown the importance of
 
budgetary institutions on fiscal performance. This paper attemps to show
 
varying effects between keeping public finance in a good state(Fiscal Preven-
tion)and restoring it from once worsened state(Fiscal Consolidation)follow-
ing the two step approach of Lavigne(2006)but using not the multinomial logit
 
model that Lavigne adopted but the mixed logit model which can overcome the
 
problem of the Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives. Using the database of
 
Hallerberg (2004)and appending the data of Anglosaxon countries and Japan
 
based on historical overview,this paper shows that there are varying effects for
 
delegation state strategy,between Fiscal Prevention and Fiscal Consolidation,
and the latter may not be realizable using delegation state strategy. This is a
 
serious result for all delegation countries which are predicted to encounter
 
enourmous difficulties in trying to restore public finance. As a policy relevant
 
suggestion,fiefdom countries such as Japan may have to consider the opportu-
nity of commitment approach, although a drastic political reform may be
 
indispensable for this strategy and specifically one would need to diminish the
 
influence of veto players.
Keywords:Fiscal consolidation;Political economy;Budgetary institutions;
Multinomial Logit;Mixed Logit.
Introduction
 
Economic and fiscal crisis of 2008 hit hard most of industrialized countries.
Especially, large European countries like France, Germany, and the United
 
Kingdom have shown unequivocal deterioration of public finance which has far
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 overflown away the borderline of 60% debt per GDP,one of EU fiscal criteria.
On the contrary,relatively small countries,such as Denmark,Finland and the
 
Netherlands keep their fiscal state mostly under control,even though its deterio-
ration at the end of 2000’s is undeniable.
This situation was in fact inverse during 1980’s. At that moment,France,
Germany and the United Kingdom have been among the most reliable players of
 
the European fiscal game. They were keeping good score during this period,
while such small countries as Denmark and the Netherlands(but not Finland)
were struggling with persistent fiscal fiasco.
This contrast may not be by chance. Ju?rgen von Hagen, pionneer of
 
political economy approach for governmental budgeting,classified 15 European
 
countries into Delegation States,which are characterized by concentration of
 
fiscal power,and Contract States(including “Mixed”states),characterized by
 
mid-term fiscal planning and coalition government. Large European countries
 
like France,Germany and the United Kingdom were classified as the former,
while small European countries like Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands
 
were classified as the latter. In the beginning of 1990’s,superior performance of
 
delegation states was evident for von Hagen,while success of contract states or
 
commitment approach to keep the fiscal governance in good state was limited.
This contrasting image of 1980’s and 2000’s may suggest us a new potential
 
source for reflection which could henceforth navigate us towards relevant
 
strategy for robust fiscal governance. Generally we are likely to adopt one size
 
fits all solution,which is also one of the characteristics of EU fiscal prudence
 
framework. But what if we couldn’t apply one solution to all countries regard-
less of the difference of each country’s background,and had better be oriented
 
for a more context driven fiscal governance strategy?
Especially,the crisis that the world is confronting now is not comparable in
 
its size to past temporary fiscal and economic crises. So can we believe that the
 
measures effective in an economically stable era are still effective in such a
 
historical disaster? It is possible that we had better distinguish between the
 
measures effective in normal times and those needed in emergency.
France, Germany and the United Kingdom have all been keeping their
 
public finance relatively managed, but especially France and Germany have
 
never experienced rapid restoration of once deteriorated fiscal state. The
 
quality of their fiscal management has been gradual improvement. Surely the
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UK had more fluctuations in its fiscal management,but in general,these repre-
sentative delegation countries may not be good at rapid fiscal consolidation in
 
times of financial crisis. Furthermore,other delegation states like Spain,Italy,
Greece all suffer from the recent economic crisis and rapidly deteriorating
 
public finance, so that they have been ridiculed as “Club Med”by the ex-
Chairman of the Federal Reserve in the United States,Alan Greenspan. They
 
may not be resistant to a big crisis.
In this respect,a recent contribution of an Economist of Bank of Canada,
Robert Lavigne,draws our interest. He suggested a two step analysis aimed at
 
distinguishing the eventuality of serious fiscal needs (worsening)and that of
 
fiscal consolidation from once worsened fiscal state. He suggests that different
 
institutional settings have different effects in fiscal needs eventuality and in the
 
choice of fiscal consolidation. Although his analysis didn’t directly include
 
budgetary institution variables,he could still discriminate centralized countries
 
from more democratic countries using various political variables.
Nevertherless his analysis has a shortcoming of using multinomial logit
 
model,irrelevant for his problem framework. This paper tries to remedy this
 
defect using a different analytical approach,“Mixed Logit Model”. This paper
 
also applies direct indicators of budgetary institutions developped by Hallerberg
(2004)and tries to offer a differential analysis between two cases. One case is
 
fiscal consolidation which means restoring once deteriorated public finance and
 
has been the subject of a lot of studies. This paper adds the second case of
 
maintaining good fiscal performance without fiscal consolidation endeavor. We
 
will call thereafter this case“fiscal prevention”,or “fiscal crisis prevention”,
using an expression similar to“desease prevention”or“infection prevention”.
This paper hopes to give another contribution of enlarging the sample of
 
countries being analysed. Until now, the approach of political economy of
 
budgetary process has mostly paid attention to European Countries. Other
 
regions like Latin American countries, African countries have also been
 
analysed,but we have never seen an analysis enlarging the sample of countries
 
from Euro zone to other industrialized countries like, the United States,
Westminster Countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand), and Japan. Ang-
losaxon countries have had a reputation of leading world-wide new public
 
management revolution including budgetary reform. We would need to explain
 
their fiscal performance and its relation to various budgetary reforms. What
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von Hagen and Hallerberg have maintained could be only an European phenom-
enon valid for Euro zone only. Moreover,Japan is famous for its huge debt,
touching 200% per GDP. Good political economy analysis of budgetary process
 
should also explain this extreme case. That is why our paper has the sample of
 
15 European countries and 5 other countries,Japan and 4 Anglosaxon countries.
Especially we shall try to get some policy relevant implications for the country
 
with the most serious fiscal problem in the world,Japan,which is not realizable
 
through traditional Euro-zone oriented studies as those of von Hagen and
 
Hallerberg.
Figure 1: Debt per GDP of Delegation and Contract states in 2000’s
 
Figure 2: Debt per GDP of Delegation and Contract states in 1980’s
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This paper has the following structure. First,a review of the literature on
 
political economy of budgetary institutions and the research on fiscal consolida-
tion will be presented. Second,the problems of multinomial logit model adopted
 
by Lavigne’s paper will be analysed and the alternative method of mixed logit
 
analysis will be proposed. Third,data description will be undertaken,especially
 
focusing on the problems encountered when preparing data from Japan and
 
Anglosaxon countries with regard to the characterization of budgetary institu-
tions. Fourth,first the results of mutinomial logit model and second,those of
 
mixed logit model will be compared. Finally, the results of analysis will be
 
summarized as conclusion.
1 Previous Research on Budgetary Institutions and Fiscal Consolidation
 
1.1 Previous Literature on Political Economy of Budgetary Institutions
 
We have seen the surge of political economy research on budgetary process,
under the influence of social movement intending to apply balanced budget
 
clause stipulated in many State constitutions, into the Federal government
 
following the same assertion put forth in the famous book of James Buchanan,
“Democracy in Deficit”(Buchanan (1977)). Indeed, many studies on State
 
governments(ACIR (1989),Poterba (1994),and Bohn & Inman (1996))have
 
shown the relationship between balanced budget clause and the State fiscal
 
performance. With these studies in mind,one started to ponder the relevance of
 
what is the case for American State governments to European countries,think-
ing of installing a similar constitutional prescriptions in the new European
 
Communities. Nevertheless,many European researchers didn’t agree with the
 
prevalent view in the United States. They have maintained that there might be
 
two principal approaches for sound budgetary institutions,i.e.numerical rules
 
and procedural rules,and that the latter is more effective than the former if it
 
is applied in the central or federal governments(Alesina&Perotti(1995,1996)).
Particularly,the pioneering work of von Hagen(von Hagen(1992)or von
 
Hagen& Haden(1994))is representative of this“European View”of political
 
economy of governmental budgeting,and later such works as Hallerberg & von
 
Hagen(1999),Hallerberg (2002,2004),Hallerberg,Strauch& von Hagen(2004,
2009)have developped further in this approach. For other regions too,we have
 
Fiscal Prevention or Consolidation? Differential Analysis Using Mixed Logit Model
― ―125
seen such works as Alesina et al.(1996)for Latin American countries,Gollwit-
zer (2011)for Africa,which illustrate generalization of this approach in the
 
world wide settings.
Here it is important to enumerate main alternatives of institutional stategy
 
for sound fiscal performance,if we consider the development to be made in this
 
paper based on this classification. The representative work of Hallerberg& von
 
Hagen(1999)classified two main stategies for good fiscal governance, i.e. the
 
approach of delegation state and that of contract state. The former is the
 
approach which recommends centralization of fiscal power in the hands of the
 
Prime Minister or the Minister of Finance. It is suitable to the environment of
 
majority system which makes highly promising the eventuality of absolute
 
majority of one party in the parliament. The latter is the approach which
 
recommends restricting budgetary process using mid-term numerical target. It
 
is thought to be apt to the environment of proportional representation which
 
often generates many political parties to coexist inside one country.
One of the later works using this approach,Hallerberg(2004),enriched this
 
classification developping it into the new one of 4 options,adding “mixed state”
and “fiefdom”. A mixed approach tends to emerge in states with minority
 
governments. Even with minority government,mixed remedies of centralization
 
of budgetary power or strong minister of finance, and binding multiparty
 
agreement in the mid-term in terms of numerical target can be effective enough
 
to make these countries equally fiscally resistant ones as contract or delegation
 
states. Except for the minister of finance,all ministers do not have an incentive
 
to consider the implications of their spending decisions upon the full tax burden.
If a government does little to address this “common pool problem”, then a
 
fiefdom form of governance predominates. Ministers would consider their
 
domains their “fiefdoms,”and they decide spending levels more or less in
 
isolation from one another.
As for the explaining variables of the choice of budgetary institutions for
 
each country,von Hagen and Hallerberg (and other researchers such as Mit
 
Rolf Strauch) use two approaches interchangeabley. One is the budgetary
 
institutions index developped since their first survey of 1991 through 2000 and
 
until 2004. This is qualitative index ranging from fiscal rule index,long term
 
constraint index,transparancy index,or intergovernmental relationship index.
The second is more qualitative judgement classifying sample countries into 4
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categories“annually”. Since this paper uses annual data,it is dependent on the
 
latter approach which is the initiative of Mark Hallerberg.
1.2 Research on Fiscal Consolidation
 
We have shown historical development of political economy approach on
 
budgetary process,which has given us a lot of contributions for checking the
 
influence of budgetary institutions on fiscal performance, as works of von
 
Hagen and other researchers have taken a lead in this field. But the focus of this
 
paper is looking into the influence of budgetary instituions on the possibility of
 
a large scale fiscal consolidation. Small improvement of fiscal performance is
 
not sufficient to be said to have triggerd such a big task. That is why one should
 
mention here the literature on so called“fiscal adjustment”or“fiscal consolida-
tion”. This line of studies originates from the works of McDermott& Wescott
(1996), Heylen & Everaert (2000), Alesina & Perotti (1997) or Alesina &
Ardagna (1998), and so on. They have set threshold on the improvement of
 
fiscal performance to some level during some duration, in order to define the
 
occurrence of“fiscal consolidation”,using such indicators as Cyclically Adjust-
ed Primary Balance:CAPB,or others. Studies thereafter have followed similar
 
approaches.
We should note,however,that this line of studies has tended to mix value
 
judgement of any defined fiscal adjustment,for instance,time duration of good
 
fiscal performance after triggered fiscal consolidation, or good influence of
 
fiscal consolidation on pushing up economy(so called non-Keynesian effect or
 
expansionary fiscal consolidation,as shown in the studies pioneered by the work
 
of Giavazzi& Pagano(1996)). But we intend to concentrate on occurence of
 
fiscal consolidation itself. We could refer as this line of studies to von Hagen
 
et al.(2001),von Hagen& Strauch(2001),Ahrend et al.(2006),Mierau et al.
(2007),Guichard et al.(2007),Larch& Turrini(2008),Wagschall&Wenzelbur-
ger (2011)...etc. Still, the number of these studies are fewer than the afore-
mentioned literature on“good”fiscal consolidation.
Although fiscal consolidation research has been sufficiently rich as we have
 
seen,one could add one pioneering study that appeared recently. This is the
 
work of Robert Lavigne(Lavigne(2006)),which suggested a two step approach
 
which distinguishes the fiscal consolidation from worsened fiscal state and the
 
generation of fiscal needs, i.e. worsening of fiscal performance over some
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defined threshold. Just as political economy factors can affect the likelihood of
 
successfully implementing a public austerity program,they might also be critical
 
in determining whether a country falls into a situation of fiscal distress in the
 
first place. However,the probabilities of achieving an exceptional fiscal effort
 
and maintaining good fiscal policy over time(that is,avoiding fiscal crises)may
 
not be influenced by the same set of political economy factors. For instance,in
 
developping countries,high institutional quality usually imposes greater rigour
 
on fiscal policy,but inflexible institutional frameworks can constrain govern-
ment action in times of fiscal distress, impeding fiscal adjustment (Lavigne
(2006)). Lavigne said that this interpretation is broadly in line with Abiad and
 
Baig (2005),who find that high executive constraints(a measure of checks and
 
balances)weaken fiscal efforts by inducing decision-making paralysis. Such
 
findings of differential effects of political economy factors are highly interesting
 
for future consideration of improvement strategy of budgetary institutions.
Nevertheless, this pionneering work of Robert Lavigne still has certains
 
limits. First,Lavigne’s paper tries to show that the political and institutional
 
dimensions of large and sustained fiscal adjustments matter. It set forth key
 
factors chosen from a number of such factors as political stability variables,
vested interest variables,social divisions variables and the role of institutions
 
variables. And he takes a whole of the world sample using a panel of 61
 
advanced and developing countries,analysed for each country group. It means
 
he doesn’t get involved with the budgetary institutions themselves. He adopted
 
as political variables“Rule of law”indicator,democratic accountability,politi-
cal stability and election, which could be indirectly related with budgetary
 
institutions,but none of them is the direct representation of the state of budget-
ary process. What is more necessary for the analysis of governmental budgeting
 
is an analysis based on some direct indicator of budgetary institutions, even
 
though this strategy is likely to restrict available sample for the analysis due to
 
data availability of the details of budgetary process. This is necessary for more
 
policy relevant analysis,which intends to offer an important policy choice on
 
governmental budget process. Second,analytical method of Robert Lavigne has
 
also important defect as we could guess it from the change of analytical method
 
between Lavigne (2006)and Lavigne (2011)(this problem will be discussed
 
intensively in the next section).
Despite of these limits,policy implications contained in Lavigne(2006)are
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highly important. If we denied the value of his works,it would be similar to a
 
sinful waste like“throwing the baby out with the bath water”. This can be said
 
despite low profile of Lavigne (2011). Surely Lavigne (2011)mentions as
 
precedent an important work, Mierau et al. (2007)which is published and
 
accepted after Lavigne(2006),and naturally never mentioned in Lavigne(2006).
Although Mierau et al.(2007)is important as one of good panel data analysis
 
papers, it only intended to have two similar but quantitatively different
 
analysises,making the most of the difference of definition of fiscal consolidation
 
adopted by Heylen& Eveaert (2008)and von Hagen et al.(2002),the former
 
having adopted mild consolidation strategy, the latter radical one. It never
 
enables us to show the cases,as Lavigne(2006,2011),of maintaining good fiscal
 
policy over time or avoiding fiscal crises,or of failing or not trying to make
 
necessary fiscal consolidation when governments should face it. This paper is
 
intended to offer useful and policy relevant study following policy implication
 
proposed in Lavigne’s papers,while overcoming problems in their analytical
 
aspects.
2 Empirical Methods
 
2.1 Problems of Multinomial Logit Model
 
As this paper put forth the mixed logit model as superior method to the
 
multinomial logit model adopted in Lavigne(2006),which all the same offered
 
a complex structure of two step choice,one being the generation of fiscal needs,
the other the occurrence of fiscal adjustment, it is important here to simply
 
review important characterictics of the multinomial logit model before pointing
 
out its strucutural problems(Glasgow(2001a)).
Multinomial Logit Model assumes that the utility yielded by alternative j to
 
individual i can be represented by:
??＝??＋?? (1)
Here??represents the systematic (observed)portion of utility, and ??
represents the stochastic(unobserved)portion of utility. The multinomial logit
 
model assumes that the unobserved portions of utility??are identically and
 
independently distributed(IID)in accordance with the extreme value distribu-
tion. The probability that individual i will select alternative j is given by:
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(2)?????
where??is the utility yielded by alternative k to individual i and??is the
 
choice set faced by individual i.The probability is between zero and one,and the
 
probabilities sum to one over all alternatives.
The Multinomial Logit Model can be thought of as simultaneously estimat-
ing binary logits for all comparisons among the alternatives. MNL is superior
 
to repeated applications of binomial logit in terms of efficiency. In general,with
 
j alternatives,only j-1 binary logits need to be estimated. All j estimations could
 
include redundant information.
These are the simplest sketch of multinomial logit model. Lavigne(2006)
tried to adopt this multinomial logit approach to the following problem settings.
His paper introduced the notion of fiscal need, which makes it possible to
 
differentiate between three different states:when a country succeeds in making
 
a fiscal adjustment in the presence of a large need(type 1),when a country fails
 
to do so(type 0)and when a country faces no fiscal need(type 2).
Lavigne(2006)applied multinomial logit model to this choice structure of
 
three alternatives. But this choice structre hides his original and theoretical
 
choice structure of three stage choice. First countries face the choice of
 
generating serious fiscal needs or avoiding this by making successfully preven-
tive fiscal management. This is the choice 1(Fiscal Needs or No Fiscal Needs).
Second,among the countries with serious fiscal needs,some try to make fiscal
 
efforts,others do not. This is the choice 2(Try to Make a Fiscal Effort or Does
 
not Try). Even though the countries make fiscal efforts,some will not succeed
 
after various efforts. This is the third choice of Successful Fiscal Consolidation
 
or Failed Fiscal Consolidation. For his analysis,Type 2 is No Fiscal Needs case,
Successful Fiscal Consolidation is type 1,and there is some amalgam between
 
the countries with fiscal need but which do not try consolidation, and the
 
countries which tried consolidation but failed to do that, both of which are
 
mixed together into the same box of Type 0. But this amalgam is not the
 
problem here. The problem is that, while Lavigne (2006) supposed some
 
sequential structure of choice theoretically, the analytical tool chosen is the
 
multinomial logit model,which supposes the choice structure of the same level.
The multinomial logit should be used for an indifferent structure among multiple
 
choices. But the theoretical reasoning adopted by Lavigne(2006)is oriented for
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some nested or sequential structure,it means that his choice of method may not
 
be suitable to his problem settings. He should have chosen nested logit or
 
sequential logit model for his research objective although panel data analysis is
 
normally not feasible for these models.
Approaching this problem from another aspect, we could point out the
 
problem of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives:IIA,which requires the
 
independence of the probability of one particular alternative to be chosen
 
relative to the second alternative,from the existence of the third alternative.
For multinomial logit model,this IIA condition should necessarily hold.
The essence of IIA condition is the independence of the share of one
 
commodity from that of the other commodity,if there are only two commodities.
A famous good example for explaining that is “red bus/blue bus problem”.
Commuters initially face a decision between two modes of transportation:car
 
and red bus. Suppose that a consumer chooses between these two options with
 
equal probability,0.5,so that the odds ratio equals 1. Now suppose a third mode,
blue bus,is added. Assuming bus commuters do not care about the color of the
 
bus, consumers are expected to choose between bus and car still with equal
 
probability,so the probability of car is still 0.5,while the probabilities of each
 
of the two bus types is 0.25. But IIA implies that this is not the case:for the odds
 
ratio between car and red bus to be preserved,the new probabilities must be:car
 
0.33;red bus 0.33;blue bus 0.33. This is a completely strange result.
This irrationality is due to the IIA imposed on the environment in which red
 
bus and blue bus are similar or substitute. Generally IIA doesn’t hold especially
 
if there are similar alternatives or substitutes. A partial solution for this
 
problem is adopting nested logit model, if one surely knows that particular
 
options are mutually similar or substitute. IIA will also be violated if we omit
 
a variable that is common to two alterantives since the omitted variables will be
 
captured in the stochastic components of the two alternatives,making them
 
appear correlated(Glasgow,Golder& Golder(2010,2011)).
In fact this relates to another important assumption inherent in Multinomial
 
Logit model,which is the assumption of the unobserved portions of utility being
 
identically and independently distributed(IID)in accordance with the extreme
 
value distribution. And IIA will hold in any discrete choice model that assumes
 
the unobserved portions of utility are IID. IID holds if each of a sequence of
 
random variables has the same probability distribution as the others and all are
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mutually independent. MNL has a type II extreme value distribution.
We can formalize IIA in the case of MNL as follows.
????
????＝
???
???＝??????＝?????? (3)??? ???
This holds since the MNL is expressed as ??＝??＋??, and ??is iid
 
extreme value. Here the utility of the alternatives depends only on j and l.
Moreover,as the data doesn’t change between??and??,when IIA is violated,
we see thatβis different among alternatives. We have,for testing this condi-
tion,several procedures as Hausman test or Small-Hsiao test.
In fact Lavigne (2006)reports that the chi-squared test results failed to
 
reject the null hypothesis that IIA holds and it indicates that the multinomial
 
approach is appropriate (The seemingly unrelated regression estimation
(SURE)technique,which is a generalization of the Hausman test for cross-
model hypotheses,was used.). Nevertheless there is a report that empirical tests
 
for IIA condition are not necessarily reliable. Cheng & Long (2002)ran Monte
 
Carlo experiments to examine the properties of these tests,including Hausman-
McFadden(HM)test and Small-Hsiao(SH)test. They report that the Haus-
man-McFadden test shows substantial size distortion that is unaffected by
 
sample size in their simulations. For some data structures,the size properties
 
of SH test are extremely poor and do not get better as the sample size increases.
Their conclusion is that these tests are not useful for assessing violations of the
 
IIA property. Their best advice is to follow an early statement of McFadden
(1974),who wrote that the multinomial logit model should be used only in cases
 
where the alternatives “can plausibly be assumed to be distinct and weighted
 
independently in the eyes of each decision maker”. They also cites Amemiya
(1981)who suggests that the multinomial logit model works well when the
 
alternatives are dissimilar. Following their conclusion,we have no choice but
 
to evaluate qualitatively the opportunity of the use of the multinomial logit
 
model,not blindly depending on empirical tests.
Meanwhile,Lavigne(2006)had a contradiction in that it supposes nested
 
structure as analytical hypothesis,but it adopted the multinomial model,which
 
supposes no nested structure among alternatives. Nevertheless, supposing
 
nested structure would not necessarily solve the problem. It is not clear whether
 
the research object is nested or non nested before the analysis. And in this
 
paper’s case,a government may not face the choice first,on the opportunity of
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fiscal prevention and second,that on fiscal adjustment. It may ponder the choice
 
of the maintainance of good fiscal performance,taking into account the proba-
bility,its necessarily painful endurance,the enabling environment in the case of
 
fiscal consolidation. Such fiscal choice structure in this paper may have both the
 
property of sequential or nested choice,and simultaneous choice. That is why
 
we neither recommend simply supposing nested structure in this analysis, nor
 
adopting nested logit model which has also feasibility problem(not suitable for
 
panel data).
2.2 Logit and Sequential Logit
 
Lavigne(2006), intensively disscussed here,adopted multinomial logit model,
while it was followed by his second article Lavigne (2011), which adopted
 
sequential use of logit model twice in panel data settings. Nothing is reported
 
for the reason of this change of methods between the two papers. But we can
 
guess some problem existed for the use of multinomial logit model.
Exactly saying,we can call this two step use of logit model“sequential logit
 
model”,which is not logit model itself.
Sequential logit model has been used in sociology studies, for example
 
studies on the influence of economic and social factors on the rates of students
 
who go up for each higher stage of education. But there are some problems
 
pointed out as analytical method.
Cameron & Heckman (1978) point out that unobserved heterogeneity
 
problem of sequential logit model will necessarily lead to biased estimates.
For solution,Buis(2011)proposes a sensitivity analysis,specifying a number of
 
plausible scenarios concerning the unobserved variables, and estimate the
 
effects within each scenario. This approach mitigates problems inherent in
 
sequential logit model but it doesn’t clear them out.
Lavigne(2011),which is a sequential application of logit model in panel
 
data settings,does not mention this problem inherent in sequential logit model.
2.3 Mixed Logit Model
 
Under the perspective similar to Lavigne(2006,2011),this paper adopts neither
 
multinomial logit model nor sequential use of logit model,but mixed logit model.
Mixed logit model is a highly flexible method,adoptable to any random utility
 
model,and it covers sufficiently the cases where aformentioned IIA condition is
 
Fiscal Prevention or Consolidation? Differential Analysis Using Mixed Logit Model
― ―133
violated. There is another approach called multinomial probit model,similarly
 
adoptable to vast scope of situations,but it has such limits as assumption of
 
normal distribution,or its calculation is difficult. That is why recently there are
 
increasing applications of mixed logit model, rather than multinomial probit
 
model,especially in transport choice projects.
While multinomial logit model supposes iid for error components,mixed
 
logit model mitigates this condition allowing models which do not allow IIA
(Glasgow (2001a, b, c)). For that, mixed logit model partitions the error
 
components into the portion of systematic change and that of true iid error
 
components.
??＝δ??＋ε? (4)
Here??is a variable particular to the alternative j and/or the individual i.
δ?is a random variable, different for each individual. The average of the
 
random variableδ?is set to zero so that the average of the entire error compo-
nents can be zero. ε?is a random variable with zero average and iid extreme
 
value. Adopting this new error components into random utility theory,we can
 
describe as follows.
??＝β??＋δ??＋ε? (5)
This formula shows that mixed logit model is reduced to multinomial logit
 
model whenδ?＝0 for all i. δ?is not necessarily normally distributed, it can
 
assume any distribution(but in practice normal distribution is often adopted).
If the elements of??＝??then we are specifying a “random-coefficients
 
model”. In this instance the vectorβgives the mean coefficient values for the
 
elements in??,while the vectorδ?gives the deviations of each individual from
 
the mean vectorβ. Of course??＝??does not necesarrily hold(Glasgow(2001a,
b,c)). If some elements of??are not included in??,they are set not as random
 
coefficients,but fixed coefficients. If some elements of??are not included in??,
they are set as varying coefficients of zero mean in the population. Concretely,
if some elements of??are set as variables fixed among individuals,but varying
 
among alternatives,we can have“error components model”. And we can get it
 
if we can find randomness for the intercept for each alternative. (We don’t try
 
random coefficient model in this paper,which is not our main target.)
Still we could also see some correlation among alternatives in mixed logit
 
model if we want. We could see that through covariance among alternatives,
which was,however,neither significant in our study,nor shown in this paper.
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But it has nothing to do with IIA condition problem. Even if the elements ofδ?
are not correlated,under the condition of no difference ofδ?among alternatives
 
for each individual,unobserved portion of utility is necessarily correlated among
 
alternatives. This means??????,???is not zero for?≠?. Moreover if some
 
elements of??are different among alternatives, for ?≠?, we get ???????≠
???????. So if we can estimate the parameters ofδ, naturally unobserved
 
portion of utility is not iid extreme value,and IIA is violated(Glasgow(2001a,
b,c)).
Based on these analytical foundations we can proceed with estimation of
 
mixed logit model,for which we can refer to the already voluminous literature
 
in the domain(for example,Train(2009)). In essence,the estimation is based
 
on the probability????δ?to choose the alternative j conditional onδ,which is
 
unobservable however,and there is no other choice but to derive unconditional
 
probability as weighted integration using the distribution ofδ. The name of
 
mixed logit is originated from this mixture of distribution. Next,estimation is
 
made using log likelihood function. But mixed logit model cannot have analyti-
cal solution. So it is based on simulation. Recently“Halton Sequence”has been
 
used as an efficient method for that.In this paper we adopt 125 Halton draws
 
following studies of Glasgow(Glasgow(2001a,b,c)).
Note that,in mixed logit model,panel data can be accepted(Train(2009)).
We cannot exaggerate too much the importance of panel data in recent studies.
There are discrete models for panel data,but they usually suppose only binomial
 
choice,it cannot offer such multiple choice models as multinomial logit or nested
 
logit model. All that we could have from logit model for this context is,if any,
sequential structure. Mierau et al.(2007)is panel data analysis but only for two
 
different binomial choices of different steepness of fiscal adjustment. For
 
multinomial logit model, we can only pool the panel data for estimation,
although cluster standard error can be adopted for each individual,which this
 
paper also adopts for multinomial logit anlaysis following Lavigne(2006). In
 
contrast,mixed logit model can accept panel data. But it only includes different
 
timings of the same individual in the meaning of“group”,as often used in any
 
mixed model as Multilevel Linear Model. It does not automatically express
 
individual heterogeneity as fixed effect model. Similar effect could be obtained
 
by setting intercepts as random variables.
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3 Data
 
3.1 Overview on data
 
In this paper the definition of dependent variables is important since we have
 
three alternatives. For the definition of fiscal consolidation,we follow previous
 
literature using Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance(CAPB). We use the data
 
from OECD Outlook Database No.82 for that. From this data, following
 
Lavigne(2006),we define as fiscal consolidation,improvement of CAPB over
 
2.5% over 5 consecutive years. We set this fiscal adjustment as the state 2. We
 
also need to have the definition of“fiscal prevention”or “fiscal crisis preven-
tion”, which is the state of maintaining a good fiscal performance without
 
temporarily degrading public finance and coming back to a good state after-
wards. This is the state 1. We simply adopt the definition of having CAPB not
 
below-2.5%. Firstly we defined for each year/individual the state 2,secondly
 
defined the state 1 for the rest,and finally the residual elements were set as the
 
state zero, meaning neither fiscal prevention, nor fiscal adjustment, simply
 
unmanaged fiscal degradation. Lavigne (2006, 2011)adpoted the concept of
“Fiscal Needs”,and first classified the countries into those which need fiscal
 
consolidation with deteriorating public finance,and those without such needs
 
and with sound public finance, and secondly those which succeeded in fiscal
 
consolidation and those which failed,among the countries with fiscal needs. We
 
don’t adopt such nested structure. We adopt the concept of“fiscal prevention”
rather than“fiscal needs”,insisting on the existence of the strategy of keeping
 
good fiscal condition without temporarily deteriorating public finance and
 
consolidating it afterwards. This may be a parallel choice structure rather than
 
nested or sequential one.
For independent variables,we adopt such economic variables as unemploy-
ment rate,instability measured by the standard error of real growth rate during
 
past 10 years, real growth rate during past 5 years, and “trade dependency”
(export and import divided by GDP),following various papers including Annett
(2006). Unemployment should have negative coefficient since with higher
 
unemployment rate it is more difficult to make fiscal consolidation or fiscal
“prevention”. Economic instability is also expected to have negative coefficient
 
for both the state 1 and the state 2, since more unstable economy puts more
 
pressure towards adopting stabilization policy, Keynesian policy and debt
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accumulation. Besides under the hypothesis that pressure from the outside
 
world accelerates fiscal consolidation and prevention,we adopt trade depen-
dency calculated by the sum of export and import divided by the GDP. This
 
trade dependency is expected to have positive coefficient. It is likely to be larger
 
for smaller countries, of course, although the size of the country does not
 
completely overlap with this trade dependency ratio. What is important is the
 
pressure from outside,the size being one of the factors constituting this pressure.
Economic growth is thought to be useful for fiscal adjustment and prevention,
and supposed to be positive in coefficient. We use the database of the afore-
mentioned OECD Outlook Database No.82 for these variables, except for the
 
trade dependency which was derived from export, import and GDP data (all
 
nominal)of EU AMECO database.
This paper also includes political variables. One is the political constraint
 
index using the Political Constraint Index (POLCON)Dataset of Witold J.
Henisz(Associate Professor of Management at the Wharton School,the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania). This index was constructed taking into account veto
 
players(Tsebelis(2002))in multiple layers,for expressing difficulty for politi-
cal change. First,this measure identifies the number of independent branches of
 
government(executive,lower and upper legislative chambers)with veto power
 
over policy change. This initial measure is then modified to take into account
 
the extent of alignment across branches of government using data on the party
 
composition of the executive and legislative branches. The measure is then
 
further modified to capture the extent of preference heterogeneity within each
 
legislative branch which increases (decreases) decision costs of overturning
 
policy for aligned(opposed)executive branches. This variable shows the power
 
of veto players in multidimentional structure,and is expected to have negative
 
coefficient if fiscal improvement is thought to be a drastic change to status quo,
or positive coefficient if it means a continuation of status quo. That is why
 
negative coefficient is expected for the state 2 while negative or positive for the
 
state 1,depending on whether it means change or status quo.
The other variable adopted is the measure of duration of the ruling party.
This shows stability of the government. Since unstable government is expected
 
to make populist policies,leaning on deficit budgeting,this measure is thought
 
to have positive coefficient for the state 1 and the state 2. But too long a
 
duration of governing party means uncompetitive political system,or the system
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of one party dictatorship,so that it could accelerate deficit budgeting,according
 
to the discussion of Hallerberg,and have negative coefficient. For this measure
 
we take data from World Bank’s DPI2010(Database of Political Institutions).
We adopt the same budgetary institutions classification with Annett(2006),
which develops the data based on the classification of Hallerberg (2004). This
 
classification between delegation state,contract state,mixed state and fiefdom,
is well documented in Hallerberg(2004),p38. This is followed by Annett(2006),
and Pina & Venes (2011)which prepared their data until 2007 using also
 
European Commission(2006). We can safely say that this classification has not
 
basically changed since Hallerberg (2004)until now.
Note that this classification is not the product of mechanical calculation.
The classification of budgetary institutions has often changed since the pioneer-
ing work of von Hagen(1992). Hallerberg(2004)has come up with mixed state
 
and fiefdom for the first time. Portugal was first classified as delegation state,
but reclassified as fiefdom. This is an example of fluctuation during time of
 
definition in budgetary institution classification. This index /classification is
 
based on survey,not according to some objective standards, but mainly with
 
qualitative case study approach,as von Hagen and other researchers have sent
 
the questionnaires to governments and made interviews through field research.
There are also indices based on objective criteria such as“predicted delegation
 
state”or “predicted contract state”which do not, however, overlap with the
 
classification of delegation state or that of contract state (Hallerberg et al.
(2004)). It follows that we cannot expect objective and mechanical indexation
 
from the budgetary insitutions classification which is based on qualitative
 
judgement. We cannot exclude the possibility of fluctuation depending on each
 
researcher’s judgement.
We took the sample for the period from 1981 to 2007,since for this interval
 
we can have all the data for all these variables. Nevertheless we excluded
 
Luxembourg and New Zealand which don’t have CAPB data during this inter-
val. The sample in this paper is composed of Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Ireland,Italy,Netherlands,Portugal,Spain,
Sweden,the United Kingdom,Australia,Canada,Japan and the United States.
3.2 Anglo-Saxon Countries and Japan
 
We can depend on the classification of Hallerberg for 15 European countries,
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while we have no data for Anglo Saxon countries and Japan. Therefore we have
 
to create some data for these countries in order to have some useful and policy-
relevant information. This is nothing but an attempt which is basically weak as
 
compared to Hallerberg’s classification based on the results of long range
 
research since the begining of 1990’s. Nonetheless,we thought that this tentative
 
classification or the researcher’s own judgement based on historical overview is
 
acceptable considering the fact that even Hallerberg’s research depends on case
 
study,and is not the product of mechanical application of objective criteria.
First,Canada and Australia can be classified as delegation state because we
 
see concentration of power in the hands of Prime Minister or Minister of
 
Finance. These countries are also known for their strong mid term planning
 
function of budgeting. The same is true for the United Kingdom, one of
 
delegation states,so it may be one of characteristics which are typical in all
 
Westminster countries. For example,the indices of budgetary institutions for
 
the United Kingdom are high both for delegation state index and for contract
 
state index. If we could make the same kind of database for Canada,Australia
 
and New Zealand, we would get the same kind of tendency. In fact, these
 
countries have centralization of power based on often absolute majority of
 
governing party,generated from the majority election system which character-
izes Westminster countries.
Note that recently we see minority or coallition governments in the United
 
Kingdom,Canada and Australia. New Zealand quit the majority system and
 
adopted the proportional representation system. Recently coalition government
 
became a rule in New Zealand. It can be classified as contract state although
 
we don’t adopt this sample in this paper. Coalition governments or minority
 
governments of other three countries are mostly outside of our time span. We
 
classified these countries as delegation states while we are afraid that recent
 
Canada may have become a mixed state,judging from minority governments in
 
the 60’s and 2000’s(since 2004 until recently).
The presidential system in the United States makes our classification very
 
difficult. There is an aspect of delegation state as we see some degree of
 
concentration of power in central budgetary office, backed up by the strong
 
power of the President. OMB’s strong power can be illustrated by the allotment
 
control. Nevertheless,this traditional strong power of budgetary execution of
 
CBO has gradually declined before the surge of parliamentary power. One
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example is the impoundment,the power of the President not to spend money that
 
has been appropriated by the U.S.Congress. While it has been regarded as a
 
power inherent to the office of the U.S.President since its foundation by Thomas
 
Jefferson in 1801 until Nixon,who massively resorted to this budgetary tech-
nique, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was
 
passed in response to perceived abuse of the power under President Nixon. This
 
severely inhibited the president’s ability to combat excessive spending. More-
over, Congressional Budget Office estabished in 1975 gave birth to strong
 
budgetary power in the hands of the Congress,exceptional phenomenon in the
 
world. The “Gramm-Rudman-Hollings”Balanced Budget and Emergency
 
Deficit Control Act of 1985,which specified a schedule of gradually declining
 
deficit targets leading to a balanced budget in 1991 and imposed automatic and
 
across-the-board spending reductions,can be a good example of the contracts
 
closed by the President and the Congress together. We could imagine that this
 
cooperation of the President and the Congress is similar to the coalition deal
 
made among parties in Europe. After these historical findings we conclude that
 
the United States can be classified as contract state. This is a tentative
 
hypothesis as the classification of budgetary institutions for presidential system
 
countries has not been discussed in the literature since political economy of
 
budgetary process has concentrated on parliamentary system countries. Further
 
development for this problem is to be expected in the future research.
Japan is regarded as fiefdom as is Portugal in Hallerberg’s study. For
 
consideration of Japanese budgetary institutions we need to divide the historical
 
development until 1980’s and the further development since 1990’s. In Hallerber-
g’s classification,what is important is not the election system itself, but the
 
party system, especially party competition and party stability (Hallerberg
(2004),p.15).
Japanese situation until 80’s can be thought to be similar to Italian situation.
Japanese ruling party was LDP,while Christian Democrats ruled Italy. The
 
very heart of the common pool resource problem is that there is a temptation to
 
draw from the common pool to pay for specific goods,if there is no punishment
 
for ignoring the full tax burden, then parties will spend and spend. The
 
punishment ultimately comes from voters who punish irresponsible govern-
ments. Voters cannot punish governments if there is no credible opposition.
Fiscal reforms,therefore,will fail when there are uncompetitive party systems.
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Italy before the early 1990’s is an illustrative case for that(Hallerberg (2004)).
In 1994,Italy ceased its proportional representation system and introduced
 
a new electoral law which is a mixed system based both on plurarity for 75% of
 
the seats and on proportional representation for 25%. After that, generated
 
politcal competition led to the presence of two clear electoral blocks,and with
 
delegation of power to a strong finance minister, Italy became one of the
 
delagation states. Japan has witnessed a similar electoral reform in 1996(37.5%
is for proportional representation),but Japanese political system has remained
 
unstable. From 1990’s to 2000’s, there have been massive changes in party
 
alignment. The main opposition party against LDP has also changed from
 
Socialist Party,Shinshinto,to Democratic Party,coalition partners of LDP or
 
Democrats have also changed,for example from Social Democrats to Komeito
(Clean Government Party), and so on. In 2000’s gradually we have seen the
 
surge of two electral blocs of one part LDP and Komeito,and the other part
 
Democratic Party and Social Democratic Party, but none of them remain
 
sufficient to make an absolute majority often seen in Westminster countries,
especially since Japanese two chamber system tends to break absolute majority
 
by the election of one of the two chambers(elections of two chambers are not
 
held simultaneously in Japan). Supremacy of the lower chamber over the upper
 
is also partial and not complete. As Hallerberg says, an unstable political
 
system like Ireland or Portugal,makes it difficult to institutionalize a given
 
form of governance. A shift back and forth among one party majority govern-
ment,minority government and multiparty coalition government does not allow
 
the institutional structure to gel. This leads to another way of becoming fiefdom
 
as well as politically uncompetitive system,and Japan since 90’s seems to be
 
following this scenario.
Note,however,that this is only a“provisional”classification of budgetary
 
institutions for Japan and Anglo Saxon countries. This is also based on
 
qualitative observation,subjective to the researcher’s non objective judgement.
But it is basically the same as in Hallerberg’s study,primarily based on secon-
dary sources but completed by on site interview,phone call,correspondence by
 
fax or e-mail (Hallerberg (2004)). Qualitative data can help researchers to
 
make prudent judgement considering social context of each country. We judged
 
that making classification of budgetary institutions for Japan and Anglo Saxon
 
countries from historical data is a permissible practice,and made a decision to
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make the most of these data in this paper’s analysis.
4 Results
 
First we describe the descriptive statistics of our sample. Next we proceed to
 
make multinomial logit analysis before finally showing the results of mixed logit
 
model.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
 
This paper adopts as explanatory variables unemployment,instability,growth,
trade dependency,political constraint,years of the rule of the governing party,
and dummy variables of budgetary institutions signifying delegation state and
 
contract or mixed state. The dependent variable is set as 2 for fiscal adjustment,
1 for fiscal prevention,and zero for the other cases. This dependent variable is
 
modified from the rate of CAPB for fiscal adjustment,and CAPB itself for fiscal
 
prevention. These “materials”of dependent variables are added before the
 
dependent and independent variables in the table 1 showing the descriptive
 
statistics of these variables.
We cover the interval of 27 years from 1981 to 2007,and 18 countries except
 
Luxembourg and New Zealand, so we have 27×18＝486 samples for each
 
variable. Primary balance is slightly positive on average. We seem to have
 
balanced samples between positive and negative balances,even though we have
 
slight tendency for positive balance. Similarly we have slight improvement in
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
 
Variables
 
CAPB
ΔCAPB
 
Consolidation/Prevention
 
Delegation
 
Contract/Mixed
 
Unemployment
 
Instability
 
Growth
 
Trade Dependency
 
Political Constraints
 
Government Years 7.239 6.9 486
0.476 0.094 486
66.031 34.046 486
2.661 1.404 486
1.858 0.759 486
7.61 3.31 486
0.348 0.477 486
0.356 0.479 486
1.082 0.542 486
0.158 1.418 486
0.589 2.814 486
Mean  S.D. N
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CAPB on the average. Dependent variable is slightly over 1. In fact,we have
 
a lot of country/year cases of the state 1(fiscal prevention). We have more
 
limited samples for the state 2(fiscal consolidation)and the state zero(deterior-
ating public finance).
For independent variables,mean unemployment rate is 7%, and it repre-
sents matured or stagnating economy of already developed countries like in
 
Europe. The growth rate of 2.7% represents low growth rate of developed
 
countries. Trade dependency is over 60%. We have moslty open economy
 
sample here,while Japan is more closed hitting a very low score of 20%. This
 
variable shows pressure from outside,seen in many countries,towards restoring
 
or keeping public finance. Years of ruling party governance is over 7 years,
which makes us imagine stable or stagnated political structure. We have one
 
third probability for delegation state or contract /mixed state. It means that
 
the probability of fiefdom is also one third. Note here that we add mixed state
 
samples to contract state samples,following Annett(2006). It has been judged
 
that mixed state is not so different from contract state in its effects or character-
istics.
This sample is,first,used for multinomial logit analysis in the next subsec-
tion.
4.2 Results of Multinomial Logit Analysis
 
Table 2 shows positive effects both for delegation states and for contract /
mixed states,whichever approach appears to be effective for fiscal prevention
 
or consolidation. These are clear effects considering 1% significance for all
 
these variables. These effects are bigger for contract /mixed states than for
 
delegation states,meaning that contract /mixed state approach is superior to
 
delegation state approach in this analytical setting.
Turning to other explanatory variables,we find that unemployment rate
 
was a negative coefficient for both cases,while both sides are non significant.
Instability has a negative coefficient for both cases, and clear result of 1%
significance for both. Growth rate has a positive coefficient for both,while only
 
fiscal prevention case has 1% significance, leaving fiscal consolidation phase
 
non significant. Trade dependency has positive effect for both and clear effect
 
of 1% significance. Political constraints have negative effect for both and 1%
significance for both. The years of the rule of governing party have positive
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coefficient for both,while only fiscal consolidation phase has 5% significance.
In general,we got similar effects both for fiscal adjustment phase and fiscal
 
prevention phase. We got many clear effects of 1% significance. We found that
 
effects differ between two phases only for growth rate and years of governance.
We attempted to assess the IIA condition test,“suest-based Hausman test”
as did Lavigne(2006),a modified version of Hausman& McFadden test. It is
 
recently often practiced on the grounds that the result of Hausman test and that
 
of Small-Hsiao often lead to different conclusions. The result of the test is
 
20.751 for fiscal prevention phase,17.450 for fiscal adjustment phase,superior to
 
16.92 of Chi 2 value with the degree of freedom being 9 (5% significance),with
 
probability 0.014 and 0.042 respectively, rejecting the null hypothesis of IIA
 
condition. Application of multinomial logit would be seriously flawed if we are
 
to judge from this test.
We have also tried cluster standard error results following the strategy of
 
Lavigne (2006). There are some differences between two trials. Economic
 
Variable
 
Table 2: Results:Multinomial Logit
 
Prevention
 
Delegation
(cluster S.E.)
Contract/Mixed
(cluster S.E.)
Unemployment
(cluster S.E.)
Instability
(cluster S.E.)
Growth
(cluster S.E.)
Trade Dependency
(cluster S.E.)
Political Constraints
(cluster S.E.)
Government Years
(cluster S.E.)
Intercept
(cluster S.E.)
N 486
2.997 (2.109) (cluster S.E.) 3.814? (1.530)
2.997? (1.504) Intercept 3.814? (1.620)
0.035 (0.049) (cluster S.E.) 0.064 (0.067)
0.035 (0.028) Government Years 0.064? (0.030)
-6.728? (3.981) (cluster S.E.) -8.481? (3.584)
-6.728?? (2.393) Political Constraints -8.481?? (2.603)
0.033?? (0.010) (cluster S.E.) 0.029?? (0.009)
0.033?? (0.008) Trade Dependency 0.029?? (0.009)
0.387?? (0.124) (cluster S.E.) 0.026 (0.201)
0.387?? (0.150) Growth 0.026 (0.168)
-0.715? (0.320) (cluster S.E.) -0.849?? (0.315)
-0.715?? (0.231) Instability -0.849?? (0.265)
-0.082 (0.060) (cluster S.E.) -0.056 (0.064)
-0.082 (0.052) Unemployment -0.056 (0.058)
3.310?? (1.065) (cluster S.E.) 2.617?? (0.954)
3.310?? (0.701) Contract/Mixed 2.617?? (0.741)
1.740?? (0.649) (cluster S.E.) 1.596? (0.682)
1.740?? (0.427) Delegation 1.596?? (0.477)
Consolidation
 
Coefficient (S.E.) Variable  Coefficient (S.E.)
Log-likelihood
χ????
-324.759
135.879
Significance: ?:10% ?:5% ??:1%
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instability is now less significant for fiscal prevention case,now 5% significant
 
rather than 1% significant. Political constraints have now less significant
 
effects for both cases,10% significant for fiscal prevention,5% significant for
 
fiscal consolidation. The years of the rule of the governing party is no more
 
significant for fiscal adjustment. But in general,the results are not that different
 
from those without cluster standard errors.
It follows that we can safely conclude that we don’t have much different
 
effects between contract state and delegation state,both for fiscal prevention
 
and fiscal adjustment as far as we adopt multinomial logit model as one research
 
method. We also have clear effects for all variables except unemployment and
 
the years of governance. In general,every variable has similar effects for fiscal
 
prevention and fiscal consolidation,with slight difference in numbers. It is often
 
significant for both fiscal prevention and fiscal consolidation, except growth
 
rate and political constraints index in cluster case, meaning that we have
 
parallel effects between two phases in general.
Note,however,that the results of multinomial logit model have the follow-
ing limitations.
First,multinomial logit model is not applicable if IIA is violated. Empirical
 
tests for this are also unreliable. And we got the result of IIA violation using
“suest-based Hausman test”at least.
Second,multinomial logit is based on pooled data. We cannot use fixed
 
effect of panel data model. If we could deduce unobserved heterogeneity, the
 
estimation results could be quite different. We will see that we can treat this
 
problem using random coefficient in mixed logit model. Surely we can partially
 
take into account this problem because we adopted cluster standard errors
 
following Lavigne (2006). But this approach cannot completely solve this
 
problem and the opportunity for trying panel data analysis still holds.
Third,multinomial logit model is difficult to interpret. It is said that we
 
cannot use coefficients themselves as“effects”and we need to rely on marginal
 
effects calculation (Greene (2008)). There is no mention of this problem in
 
Lavigne(2006). But the disadvantage of marginal effects in multinomial logit
 
model is that they often return different sign and different size of effects as
 
compared to the coefficients. That is why alternative way of RRR (Relative
 
Risk Ratio) representation is proposed for interpretation (Powers and Xie
(2000)).We can also represent effects using RRR concept as follows.
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This RRR representation shows the probability of fiscal prevention relative
 
to fiscal degradation,and that of fiscal consolidation relative to fiscal degrada-
tion. The numbers smaller than 1 are parallel to negative coefficients in the
 
table 2,the absolute value shows the bigger probability of fiscal prevention or
 
consolidation as compared to fiscal degradation. The numbers nearly zero mean
 
greater probability of fiscal degradation. The numbers nearly unity are ambigu-
ous effects. Judging from this RRR representation, the effects of budgetary
 
institutions are clear. But other control variables have ambiguous effects,
especially so for unemployment rate,trade dependency,and the year of govern-
ance of ruling party. There are clear effects for instability and political
 
constraints, both seem to make sufficient pressure toward fiscal degradation.
Growth rate has varying effects, with clear effect for fiscal prevention, and
 
ambiguous effect for fiscal consolidation.
RRR representation gives us somewhat easier interpretation of multinomial
 
logit model,although the appropriateness of multinomial logit model in this case
 
is doubtful due to IIA violation. If we use mixed logit model,we don’t need any
 
such manipulation since the marginal effects are the same as the coefficients.
We will next show the results of mixed logit model using panel data.
4.3 Results of Mixed Logit Analysis
 
The table 4 shows estimation results of mixed logit model. This paper
 
adopts error components model, realized by setting only intercepts for fiscal
 
prevention and consolidation as random variables. Note here standard devia-
tions of intercepts for fiscal prevention and consolidation. As these are signifi-
cant of 1%, this fact is already sufficient in order to say that we have error
 
Year of Governance
 
Political Constraints
 
Trade
 
Growth
 
Instability
 
Unemployment
 
Contract/Mixed
1.04
0.00
1.03
1.47
0.49
0.92
27.38
1.07
0.00
1.03
1.03
0.43
0.95
13.69
4.935.70
RRR:Consolidation RRR:Prevention
 
Delegation
 
Table 3: multinomial logit:RRR representation
 
Variable
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components model. When we have error components model,this automatically
 
means that expressions are models with IIA condition violated. So this is a
 
sufficient argument for mixed logit model to be considered superior to
 
multinomial logit model in this application.
Next,we will test the important hypothesis of this paper that the strategy
 
of budgetary institutions may give us different effects depending on whether the
 
authorities are trying to keep good public finance or restoring it after deteriorat-
ing it first. For that we need to see if the coefficients and significance of two
 
strategies“delegation state”and“contract state”,can be different depending on
 
the phase of fiscal prevention or that of fiscal adjustment.
First,in case of contract /mixed state,we have positive coefficients both
 
for fiscal prevention and consolidation. Both are significant of 1%. So we can
 
say that multiparty fiscal committment with mid term planning function is
 
effective both for keeping good public finance and restoring once deteriorated
 
budget,and it is the similarity between mixed logit model and multinomial logit
 
model. While the coefficient for fiscal prevention is higher than that for fiscal
 
consolidation,the latter is sufficiently important in its size effect.
On the contrary,for delegation state, the coefficient is positive and suffi-
ciently important in its size for fiscal prevention phase. Effect is significant of
 
1%,meaning that the results are reliable similarly to the results of multinomial
 
Significance Level: ?:10% ?:5% ??:1%
46.344
-302.046
χ???
Log-likelihood
(S.E.)Coef.Var.(S.E.)Coef.
Consolidation:Mean
(0.088)-0.063Unemployment(0.097)-0.209?
(0.198)0.026Growth(0.184)0.384?
(0.379)-1.421??Instability(0.328)-0.984??
(0.012)0.032??Trade Dependency(0.014)0.043??
(3.770)-11.012??Political Constraints(3.613)-3.380
(0.023)0.039?Government Years(0.002)0.001
(0.803)0.740Delegation(0.791)3.589??
(0.905)2.715??Contract/Mixed(0.910)3.619??
(2.267)6.291??Intercept(2.292)2.247
Consolidation:S.D.
(0.290)-0.968??Intercept(0.366)1.649??
1458N
 
Intercept
 
Prevention:S.D.
Intercept
 
Contract/Mixed
 
Delegation
 
Government Years
 
Political Constraints
 
Trade Dependency
 
Instability
 
Growth
 
Unemployment
 
Prevention:Mean
 
Table 4: Results:Mixed Logit
 
Var.
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logit model. Especially the absolute value of coefficients is large and similar
 
between delegation states and contract/mixed states,showing clearer effect for
 
delegation state than in case of multinomial logit model. Nevertheless, the
 
result for fiscal consolidation is no more significant with its absolute value being
 
much smaller too. Such differential effect between fiscal prevention and fiscal
 
consolidation is not what can be obtained through multinomial logit model,
suggesting potential power of mixed logit model as a research method.
We could give some interpretation to the differential effect of delegation
 
state between two phases of fiscal prevention and consolidation. Delegation
 
state function has a merit of concentration of power in the hands of minister of
 
finance and prime minister,avoiding by this the common pool problem. Such
 
concentration of power should also be seen in all the aspects of budgetary
 
process:budget formation,budget discussion in parliament,and finally budget
 
execution. For each aspect we must avoid influence of stakeholders other than
 
central budget office. A fortiori,CBO must be able to intervene into all the
 
details of budget. Fiscal performance can be improved in delegation state if
 
CBO can accumulate small economies from detail intervention to budgetary
 
programs. Nevertheless once fiscal performance has deteriorated severely, it
 
would be difficult to improve it drastically only with such small economies,since
 
this can be effective only if we can continue such economies constantly,and it
 
is fundamentally impossible to realize“one shot”drastic cut with this strategy.
Necessarily we would need more drastic and macroeconomic strategy,which,
based on mid term fiscal planning, clarifies total economy to realize, and
 
distribute share parts to the departments,forcing them to realize cut“come hell
 
or high water”.
For instance, faced with serious fiscal crisis in mid 90’s Japanese local
 
governments tried to improve fiscal performance using performance and pro-
gram budgeting but it meant squeezing economy by conducting close investiga-
tion which takes a lot of time and energy. When fiscal crisis got deepened in
 
2000’s this old method became defective in dealing with sudden fall of fiscal
 
revenue,and they turned to a more radical method like “Frame Distribution
 
Budget”,which first set total saving plan and next distributed share parts to the
 
departments. This fact illustrates well the difference between two strategies
 
and their advantage/disadvantage.
Such a differential effect can also be seen in other independent variables.
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We can recall that in multinomial logit model,we got generally similar effects
 
in terms of sign and size of coefficients and their significance,for fiscal preven-
tion or fiscal consolidation. We have got cases of growth and political con-
straints which showed significance only on one side,while other variables didn’t
 
show significant difference between the two cases.
In mixed logit model,we get more differential effects in terms of sign and
 
size of coefficients and their significance. Particularly,we have many variables
 
with significance only on one side. Unemployment rate has a negative sign,
which means that fiscal improvement is difficult under difficult economic situa-
tion with a lot of unemployed workers, but this is significant only for fiscal
 
prevention case. Non significance for fiscal consolidation phase could mean that
 
fiscal consolidation from sufficiently deteriorated public finance could be a kind
 
of emergency,which makes fiscal consolidation indispensable with or without
 
high rate of unemployment. Higher growth rate may make fiscal improvement
 
easier since the coefficients are positive,but we have got significant coefficient
 
only for fiscal prevention. The coefficients of political constraints are all
 
negative, but one is significant for fiscal consolidation, and the other is non
 
significant for fiscal prevention. The value of the coefficient itself for fiscal
 
adjustment is large. This represents an accentuated contrast with multinomial
 
logit analysis,which showed significance only for fiscal prevention. The result
 
suggests that it is important to diminish the influence of veto players in the
 
phase of fiscal consolidation,when we can expect a lot of stakeholders to resist
 
the reform. Veto players’resistance may not be serious in normal phase of
“daily”fiscal crisis prevention efforts. Besides, the years of governance of
 
ruling party is significant of 10% (probability of 9.2%)for fiscal consolidation.
while there was no significant result related to years of governance in
 
multinomial logit model. All positive results of governance years,in mixed logit
 
analysis or multinomial logit analysis,may mean that this variable should be
 
interpreted as stability factor of governance which makes any fiscal improve-
ment more feasible,and not as stagnation factor which may hinder any fiscal
 
efforts without political competition. But this can be observed only with fiscal
 
consolidation phase with very limited significance which makes us vigilant
 
against focusing too much on this variable.
For the other two variables,we don’t see accentuated difference between
 
the two phases. Instability has negative coefficients with 1% significance both
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for fiscal prevention and for fiscal consolidation, although the size of coeffi-
cients is slightly different. Economic instability could prevent the country from
 
improving its fiscal performance,both at a rapid pace or by progressive steps.
Trade dependency is positive and 1% significant for both,pressure from outside
 
is good for any fiscal improvement, and the same tendency was shown in
 
multinomial logit analysis. Japanese case may be typical of lack of this outside
 
pressure since its value is 22% on sample average against total sample average
 
of 66%.
5 Conclusion
 
In this paper, we have analysed differences between fiscal prevention and
 
consolidation,of delegation state approach and that of contract or mixed state,
developping the framework used in Lavigne (2006) but replacing the
 
multinomial logit analysis used in Lavigne(2006)with mixed logit model. Our
 
use of mixed logit model avoided IIA problem inherent in multinomial logit
 
model,detected by“suest-based Hausman test”for multinomial logit as well as
 
the existence of error component model shown in mixed logit analysis. Estima-
tion results of mixed logit model show that effects of fiscal prevention and
 
consolidation for delegation state differ, and other variables have also often
 
shown differrent effects between the two senarios. This finding was not
 
obtained when we used multinomial logit model.
The mixed logit analysis adopted in paper uses panel data, sets random
 
intercepts, and introduces unobserved heterogeneity among countries in the
 
model. Panel data analysis with fixed effect normally deals with this un-
observed heterogeneity,but ordinary binomial panel data analysis cannot offer
 
the choice structure among multiple alternatives,which is only logical in this
 
paper’s context and made feasible by the mixed logit model. That is why we can
 
say that the study like Mierau et al.(2007)does not solve the problem confront-
ed by Lavigne(2006). Sequential approach adopted by Lavigne(2011)is also
 
not a solution to this problem since sequential logit analysis is necessarily
 
accompanied by unobserved heterogeneity problem. Only mixed logit analysis
 
can solve this problem of heterogeneity as it permits the use of panel data and
 
setting of random intercepts.
If the delegation state strategy is effective in fiscal prevention phase but not
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in fiscal adjustment phase,as our analysis has shown,such countries are expeted
 
to encounter extreme difficulty in the face of recent financial crisis and rapidly
 
deteriorating public finance. Even though they could have maintained relatively
 
good public finance until recently,it may be due to the size of fiscal crisis which
 
has been so limited that even delegation state approach could regulate the
 
situation. For instance,the pace of deterioration in delegation countries such as
 
France,Germany and the United Kingdom is now remarkable. They are so far
 
away from the limit of EU criteria that no perspective of their coming back can
 
be credible. Countries such as France and Germany are also well known to have
 
veto players strongly resistant to any drastic reform. Delegation states also
 
include Greece,Italy,Spain,all the“Club Med”,fiscal sustainability of which is
 
seriously doubted by financial market. It means that this paper’s analysis using
 
mixed logit model also suggests a sort of prediction that delegation states will
 
face extreme difficulty in attempts to overcome a big fiscal crisis.
This paper is also intended to give some policy relevant recommendations
 
for budgetary institutions reform, apart from predictions for delegation or
 
contract states in the face of recent economic crisis. If we try to suggest
 
something for a country with huge debt such as Japan,of course,we may need
 
to concentrate power in the hands of the minister of finance as is typical in
 
delegation countries, but it would not be sufficient due to the seriousness of
 
situation,with such enourmously deteriorated public finance. It means that we
 
may need fiscal consolidation rather than fiscal prevention, and commitment
 
approach may be important for that. Then it may be essential to strengthen mid
 
term planning function, especially enhance predictability, for example. The
 
problem with this strategy is that one cannot freely choose delegation approach
 
or commitment approach, but we are constrained by political insititutions
 
particular to each country. Japan would have limited perspective,both for purer
 
majority system enabling delegation state,and for stable coalition government
 
enabling contract state. Japanese majority system is mixed with proportional
 
representation part, and the two chamber system, with sometimes different
 
ruling parties for the two chambers, hinders realization of durable absolute
 
majority that would have been an ideal environment for such radical changes as
 
budgetary consolidation. Elections are also frequent so that we have difficulty
 
of striking a long term stable deal among coalition partners. In terms of
 
budgetary process,more profound discussion is needed in Japan,especially for
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the reform of political institutions, rather than that of budgetary institutions
 
themselves. At least,as we know from using mixed logit analysis,we may need
 
an institutional reform diminishing the influence of veto players in such coun-
tries as Japan or other“Club Med”countries facing rapid deterioration of public
 
finance, since veto players generally have strong negative influence on large
 
fiscal consolidation attempt.
In any case,budgetary institutions have varying effects depending on the
 
fiscal environment under which their reforms are conceived. One size fits all
 
reform of budgetary institutions is not feasible. We need to profoundly investi-
gate background environment of a country which is supposed to be considering
 
a budgetary reform,in terms of not only budgetary and political insitutions but
 
also the seriousness of fiscal environment(or opportunity for fiscal prevention
 
or consolidation). Without such information,the studies of budgetary process,
which should be as policy relevant as possible,cannot be fruitful.
This paper introduces into polical economy of budgetary process a mixed
 
logit model which realizes a logical and coherent platform for multiple and
 
simultaneous choice structure. The results suggest a policy relevant view which
 
shows the potential of the mixed logit model in this field.
This research was partly supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion
 
of Science under the grant number(B)23310104,and the author would like to
 
thank the organization.
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